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INSULTS-PRACTICAL JOKES-THREATS OF FUTURE
HAR IAT-HOW NEW AS TORTS?
By R.YNOLDS C. SErrz*
In two very recent and outstanding legal articles1 it was
specifically suggested that enlightened courts have recognized a
new tort which consists in intentional, outrageous infliction of
mental suffering in an extreme form. The same thought,
although not quite as pointed, has appeared within the pages of
another contemporary source.2 The trend of all the articles indi-
cates that more and more courts are expressing a philosophy
which allows a plaintiff to make a direct recovery for emotional
distress intentionally 3 inflicted. It is disclosed that some for-
ward looking courts are no longer straining to find a technical
assault, battery, trespass to property, false imprisonment, mali-
cious prosecution, or seduction to which tbhey can attach parasitic
damages for mental suffering. Honesty compels decisions which
make no artificial distinctions based on the slightest of physical
injuries. Such courts cannot see the logic in allowing a kiss,4
a spitting in the face,5 and a hug and a kiss 6 to make the differ-
ence between no damages and recovery which mounts to a thou-
sand or more dollars. In all the discussions, however, a note
of reservation is sounded. Except within a few delineated pat-
terns,7 recovery which is not attached to a technical "named"
tort has been restricted to factual situations in which the emo-
* Asst. Professor of Law, The Creighton University; B.A. 1929,
M.A. 1932, LLB. 1935, Creighton Univ. Admitted to practice in
Nebraska, 1935. Instructor in law, Univ. of Omaha Law School, 1935-36;
instructor, Creighton Univ. since 1938.
"Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Menta SuSffering: A New Tort
(1939), 37 Mich. L. R. 874. Note (1938) 22 Minn. L. R. 1030.
2Vold, Tort Recovery for Intentional Infliction of EmotionaZ Dis-
tress (1939), 18 Nebr. L. B. 222.
3 Recommendations and Studies of the State of New York Law
Revision Commission (1936) at page 437 points out that an actual
intent to cause emotional disturbance is not always necessary. As
Professor Prosser says in 37 Mich. L. R. 874, intent means more than
an actual desire to make a party suffer. It includes the thought that
defendant must have believed that mental disturbance was sub-
tantially certain to follow. This can be inferred from the act done.
'Craker v. Chicago and N. W. Ry., 36 Wisc. 657 (1875).
5 Draper v. Baker, 61 Wisc. 450, 21 N. W. 527 (1884).
6Ragsdale v. Ezell, 20 Ky. L. R. 1567, 49 S. W. 775 (1899).
7 Infra, notes 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.
L. J.-4
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tional distress broke out into a physical, tangible illness or suffer-
ing. There has been the sentiment uttered in one breath that to
allow recovery for an offense which produces only mental suffer-
ing is perhaps too new a tort, and in another bieath that to shy
away from the issue and refuse recovery will not be to heed logic.
It will be the thesis of this article that an award of damages
to one who has suffered nothing but emotional distress as a result
of an intentional act is not a new tort in essence even though it
may be one in name and result. It is submitted that our courts
have refused recovery for distress caused by offenses which do
not produce physical effects because on the whole our judiciary
has rightly been -Wary of accepting the prevalent modern maxim,
"What is new is better." These pages will attempt to disclose
ieasoning which it is bioped will point to the fact that a recovery
for causing only mental suffering is not based upon the new
nearly so much as upon the old.
Any discussion in the field of emotional distress is made more
difficult by the presence of artificial principles which have grown
out of Lord Wensleydale's famous dictum in Lynch v. Knights
to the effect that
"mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone."
Fortunately, however, the courts have progressed far in getting
away from the restricting influence of-this stereotyped legal
phrase.9 They have frequently shown that they respected the
logic inherent in Dean Green's statement'0 that it is dangerous
to continue to lay down generalizations when they are allowed to
parade under the sacrosanct banner of principles. The natural
good sense of the courts led them away from the theory that in
order to recover for emotional disturbance some "slight initial
impact" must be found.11 But the greatest advance was made
when Lord Wensleydale's pronouncement, worn smooth through
the years, bent under the friction of scientific influence. It could
89 H. L. Cas. (1861).
9 Under the title Duty and Foreseeeability Factors in Fright Cases
(1939), 23 Marquette L. R. 103, the writer of the present article dis-
cussed at some length the intelligent results that can be reached in
negligent fright cases by clearing the air of so called sacred principles
or maxims.
20 Green, Fright Cases (1933) 27 Ill. L. R. 761.
"-Homans v. Boston Elevated R. R., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737
(1902); Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R. R., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 Atl. 860
(1906).
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not wholly withstand the medical testimony that fright, shock,
anxiety, grief, rage, and shame are in themselves physical injuries
producing well marked symptoms visible to the professional
eye.1 2
In spite, however, of a generally forward looking judicial
attitude and a feeling that the Lynch v. Knight13 utterance is not
at all the substantial structure it purports to be, still continues
to be a facade behind which courts deliberate. It is most effec-
tive in the particular area covered by this discussion-the area
of intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering which
does not result in bodily harm or illness.' 4 Its importance in
the suggested factual pattern is reinforced by the most valid
objections that it will be hard to protect against fraudulent
claims, and that if recovery was allowed, the door would be
opened wide to litigation in the field of trivialities and bad
manners.
Such objections are most weighty and real. However, it
does not.follow that they must go unanswered. Dean Green 15
and Professor Prosser'0 have, in connection with the first
expressed fear, both pointed out that there exists a protection
against fraud in the fact that the jury is still required (and as
capable as always) to distinguish true claims from false. It will,
say the two leading authorities, still be necessary to prove to the
satisfaction of a jury that an intentional, outrageous act was
committed which was capable of causing mental suffering. And
as regards the second expressed fear Professor Prosser answers
with a very keen comment. He says:
"It is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court
of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will give the court
too much work to do:" 7
22 Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage (1922), 20
Mich. L. R. 497, and the medical authorities cited by Vold, note 2, supra.
2"9 H. L. Cas. (1861).
"1No attempt is made in this article to discuss the problem of
fright negligently inflicted (as to which see citations, notes 9 and 10,
supra) and emotional disturbance intentionally caused which results
in bodily harm or illness (as to which see citations, notes 1 and 2,
supra). Even in those fields, although enlightened courts are allowing
more and more recovery, there is still much conflict.
Green, Fright Cases (1933), 27 Ill. L. R. 761.
"6Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort
(1939) 37 Mich. L. R. 874.
1"1Supra, note 16.
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Still no one can deny that we do need to fear opening wide
the door to litigation based upon trivialities and bad manners.' 8
Courts cannot be criticized when they hesitate to deal with a
problem which presents so many variables. It is not surprising
that they shrink back from a corner of jurisprudence which they
fear is bound to require much day by day litigation.
It is the hope this article will bring out that the fears of the
courts are not wholly justified-that recovery can be allowed,
and yet tribunals can keep within bounds which are not as indefi-
nite as is commonly supposed.
Although courts have been hesitant about heeding claims for
mental distress which are not the outgrowth of a named tort or
wich do not manifest themselves through physical sickness, such
recovery is not by any means an oddity existing in the law. To
date, however, plaintiffs have been restricted within the limits
of relatively clear-cut catagories. They have succeeded in get-
ting an award of damages only in cases involving employee insults
to public utility customers' 9 or those who use premises which
cater to the public, 20 insults by collection agencies to debtors,21
practical jokes which cause deep humiliation or distress,22 and
'3Professor Prosser emphatically admits the argument. However,
as he puts it, "the courts ought to be able to cope with the situation
with as much effectiveness as they now administer the concepts of the
'rule of reasons,' 'fair return,' and 'reasonable man of ordinary
prudence.'"
" Bleecker v. Colorado & S. R. R., 50 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911);
Wolfe v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 2 Ga. App. 499, 58 S. E. 899 (1907);
May v. Shreveport Trac. Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671 (Q. S.) 206 (1910);
Humphrey v. Michigan United Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N. W. 447
(1911); Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 178 N. Y. 347, 70 N. E.
857 (1904); Lipman v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 108 S. C. 151, 93 S. E. 714
(1917).
2OInterstate Amusement Co. v. Martin, 8 Ala. App. 481, 62 So. 404
(1913); Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S. W. 195 (Kentucky 1909);
Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 178 So. 86 (Miss. 1938)'
(Theaters). Aaron V. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (1911) (Bath-
house). Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209
(1904) (Resort Park). Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun. 242, 36 N. Y. S. 949
(N. Y. 1895) (Dance Hall). Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga.
App. 845, 59 S. E. 189 (1907) (Telegraph Office).
2 Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25
(1932); LaSalle Extension Uni. v. Fogarty, 126 Nebr. 457, 253 N. W.
424 (1934).
=Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. Ann. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
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threats of physical harm to be done in the future.23 And in none
of the enumerated situations can it be said that the courts make
much progress toward giving us a definite and clear insight into
what might stand as a general qualification of the maxim that
recovery will not be allowed for mental distress which did not
produce tangible physical results.
Discussion during the remaining pages will be grouped
under headings which will denote the type of intentional act
involved. Attention will be paid to the all too apologetic reason-
ing of courts when permitting recovery, and analysis will be made
with intent to show that many a recovery should rest upon the
foundation of a sound general rule rather than thle insecurity of
what can conveniently become a shifting, elusive exception.
INSULTS
One explanation the courts give for allowing plaintiff to suc-
ceed is based upon a recognized exception to the strict rules of
assault which lean so heavily upon the present apparent-intention
and-ability-to-commit-a-battery theory. From the early days of
the nineteen hundreds, authority has existed24 which has today
been summarized by the Restatement of Torts2 5 prononuncement
that there is a special liability which attaches to carriers for the
insults of their servants to customers using transportation facili-
ties. This attitude is based upon the feeling that a provision of
an implied contract has been broken, and that the holding is
necessary in order to keep the carrier in line so that it will insist
upon a courteous attitude from employees. Under scrutiny this
rationale does not appear too sound. It is the generally accepted
axiom of contract law that recovery will not be allowed for
mental distress arising out of breach of contract, and it would
seem that municipal-government regulation, public disapproba-
tion, and, in many instances, competition, could be relied upon to
encourage a courteous attitude from carrier employees. As tend-
ing to prove that judicial bodies are not really worried about
their role of teacher of good manners, courts are found to be
extending their benediction2 6 upon an enlargement of the excep-
21 Wilson, et al. v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S. W. (2d) 428 (1930);
Voss v. Bolzenius, 147 Mo. App. 375, 128 S. W. 1 (1910) (where the
threats of future harm were uttered in front of third persons).
"Sfupra, note 19.
ZSec. 48 (1932).
"Supra, note 20.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
tion so that it covers utilities-and quasi-utilities-which are
outside the class of carriers. In many of these fields the existence
of competition of a real sort would produce the decorous servant.
Therefore, the real reason behind the Restatement rule seems to
be the philosophy that public utilities, or concerns which cater to
the general public, owe a greater duty to refrain from bringing
about emotional distress than do other concerns or individuals.
If, however, we have in mind the victim of the humiliating
conduct, it is hard to see how he or she suffers more from the
harsh words of a utility servant than from those of a private
corporation or individual. The harm is likely to be the same
in the one case as in the other. Furthermore, it would appear
that the possibility for fraud is no greater in the one instance
than in the other. With such facts serving as a premise, it is
reasonable to seek a sounder basis for allowing recovery for
insults which cause only mental suffering.
, It is suggested that such a sounder basis can be derived from
a study of all the cases brought against utility27 or quasi-utility28
interests which sanction the award of damages for mental dis-
tress unconnected with bodily harm or physical results. An
inspection reveals a common pattern. The irritating remarks
are addressed to the victim in the presence of third persons. The
victim, for example, is publicly and profanely accused of not
paying a fare,29 of being a "dead beat", 30 or of being indecent. 3'
In the face of such facts, it is not strange that judges would
readily believe that a person could suffer acute distress as a result
of extreme humiliation. Reflection surely induces the feeling
that very few people would pass through such life contacts with-
out definitely suffering. Hence the fear of fraud diminishes.
This becomes more realisticaly true when it is remembered that
it must be recognized that a substantial minority of men have
emotional make-ups which would place them below the average
man.3 2
2 Supra, note 19.
2 £upra, note 20.
, Humphrey v. Michigan United Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N. W. 447
(1911).
"Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 178 N. Y. 347, 70 N. E. 857(1904).
"Saenger Theater Corp. v. Herndon, 178 So. 86 (Miss. 1938).
"'Restatement, Torts (1934), sec. 312, comment c.
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Our tribunals, if they take such a position, are doing no
more than reiterating the thought, borrowed from the law of
libel, that harm has been done when a person is exposed to ridi-
cule, disgrace, contempt, hatred or contumely. The only thing
new about the approach is the candor with which the courts avoid
making distinctions of the type which separates slander from libel.
They simply treat the matter as a liability per se situation.
This attitude should not be too startling when compared
with the recommendation of the leading English judges of the
late eighteen hundreds. An inspection of their committee report
reveals th.e expression that since the distinction between slander
and libel rested on a historical rather than a solid foundation, the
law of defamation should be reformed.33 Professor Bohlen has
reiterated the same opinion in a recent writing.34 Consequently,
it is not radical to suggest that courts are sensible when they see
a need for per se liability when a person is exposed to ridicule,
disgrace, contempt, hatred or contumely. For them to realize
that a person may suffer acute mental distress and yet none of
thle special damages which are required to bring a case within the
rules of slander seems logical. And once judicial bodies recog-
nize that a wrong has been done, even though no special damage
of the type required under the rules of slander can be proved, it
is not new law to refuse to draw the line at nominal damages.
The Restatement of Torts35 and decided cases36 specifically take
the stand that once a defamation per se situation is found to exist,
liability extends to such emotional distress as normally results
from such a publication.
Viewed at such a perspective, it would seem that there should
be no hesitation or alarm about modifying Lord Wensleydale's
dictum 37 to the extent of ruling that many times recovery should
be allowed for emotional suffering unconnected with bodily harm.
Plaintiffs should succeed when they can prove insults that are
Restatement, Torts (1938) sec. 568, comment b.
1 Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1937) 50 Har. L. R. 725, where it
is remarked that the radio is doing much to break down the artificial
distinctions between the law of slander and libel.
'Restatement, Torts (1938) sec. 623.
"Walker v. Tucker, 220 Ky. 342, 295 S. W. 139 (1927); Shafer v.
Ahalt, 48 Md. 171 (1877); Terwilliger v. Wanda, 1' N. Y. 54 (1858);
Wilson v. Golt, 17 N. Y. 442 (1858); Clark v. Morrison, 80 Ore. 240,
156 Pac. 429 (1916); Zeliff v. Jennings, 61 Tex. 458 (1884); Allsop v.
Allsop, 157 Eng. Rep. 1292 (1860).
'7,9upra, note 8.
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analogous to the kind which under other circumstances might
give rise to an action for libel. This would require that heed be
given to mental disturbance when it is the outgrowth of humilia-
tion over insult delivered in the presence of a third party. It
would seem that "common sense ' 3 8 would dictate that we cannot
allow awards for all insults. In the face of the many and varied
everyday contacts of life, we must presume that individuals will
cultivate a minimum defense mechanism. They should be relied
upon to emotionally repel and forget private insults which reach
no other ear but their own. Such a situation does not seem to
afford the same stimulus toward mental discomfort. This may
be one explanation as to why the courts, with only one apparent
exception,3 9 have refused to allow women to recover for the
private affront involved in inviting them to participate in illicit
intercourse. 40
That the courts are unconsciously aware of the submitted
common sense formula is further borne out by their approach in
collection-of-debt cases. An analysis of the facts involved in
LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty4 ' makes it appear
reasonable that the deciding body found the conduct of the
defendant outrageous and overstepping the bounds of business
practice because it observed that compulsion had been brought to
bear through the technique of actually informing neighbors and
his employer that plaintiff owed a debt and would not pay it. It is
easy to agree with the judges and see that the disclosure to third
parties is calculated to cause extreme humiliation and mental
discomfort. There is no real difference in essence between calling
a man a dead beat in front of listeners and informing readers
through the medium of letters or circulars. The case of Barnett
v. Collection Service Company4 2 points the way to a further logi-
cal extension of the suggested rule for allowing recovery for
,3 Professor Harper's utterance in 10 Ind. L. J. 494 serves as pre-
cedent for setting up the rule of common sense to mark out the limits
of recovery in certain phases of tort law.
'Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S. W. (2d) 592 (1934). But
the explanation for allowing recovery here may be that the court felt
there was a threat of future harm lurking in the Invitation.0 Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348, 89 S. W. 318 (1905); Bennett
v; McIntire, 121 Ind. 231, 23 N. E. 78 (1889); Reed v. Marley, 115 Ky.
-816, 74 S. W. 1079 (1903); Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66 N. Y. S. 454(N. Y. 1900); State v. Williams, 186 N. C. 627, 120 S. E. 224 (1923).
126 Nebr. 457, 253 N. W. 424 (1934).
4214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932).
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insults. In the Barnett case the defendant had done no more
than threaten to tell third parties that plaintiff would not pay a
debt. But the judiciary seemed quick to realize that a threat to
tell third persons is as likely to cause emotional upset as an actual
utterance. Reason convinces that suchb a threat is well designed
to keep a person constantly worrying. Consequently, to give
protection against such offenses does not by any means open the
door wide to unlimited recovery for all affronts.
For confirmation of the feeling that the philosophy of tri-
bunals in the field of insult is molded around the idea that a per-
son has an interest in not being embarrassed in the presence of
third parties, the decision of Peoples Finance and Thrift Com-
pany v. Harwell43 is enlightening. There the collection concern
made emphatic and businesslike44 declarations that they would
take the household furniture and plaintiff's bed. The threats,
however, were not made in the presence of those who had no
right to hear. A holding was handed down which acknowledged
tbat all threats were not insults and that a party had a legal right
to enforce collection of a debt.
A recognition that there is made a distinction between
improper and proper business methods will serve as a starting
point for an analysis of the place of trut. as a defense to an
intentional insult action. At first glance it may seem that a
theory which has drawn an analogy between insult and defama-
tion litigation would of necessity have to take complete cog-
nizance of the fact that truth would be a good defense. How-
ever, the analogy drawn cannot be said to have made an action
for insult synonymous with one for defamation. It was only
meant to convey the thought that it is the presence-real or
imminent-of third persons which is almost certain to cause an
affronted person great mental anguish. There was no conscious
attempt to suggest that one is impelled to insult for the same
reason that one is influenced to defame. When this is under-
stood, it is clear that truth can be a good defense to a slander or
libel action, and should not always be a bar to an insult action.
"183 Okla. 459, 82 Pac. (2d) 994 (1938).
"Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corporation, 210 N. C. 808, 188 S. E.
625 (1936) is not in conflict. There the declarations, while producing a
like physical result (a premature birth) to that of the Peoples Finance
and Thrift Company case, were not businesslike but rough and
profane.
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Theoretically, it is felt that for the good of mankind in general
individuals should not be censored because they respond to the
natural urge to warn the public of antisocial members of the com-
munity. Reasons of social desirability have caused tribunals to
make truth a good defense to a defamation action.45 Within
the insult field, however, persons are induced to act for purposes
of self-interest. They do not insult with a view to giving the
public a form of warning. Consequently, the mere truth of
their statements should not always afford them protection.
A Kentucky case4 6 brings the fact out quite forcefully.
There we had an attempt on the part of a garage owner to secure
payment of a bill owed him. He made such effort by posting a
large statement to the following effect in his window:
"Doctor Morgan owes an account here of $49.67, and if promises
would pay an account, this account would have been settled long ago.
This account will be advertised as long as it remains unpaid."
The Kentucky court viewed such an advertisement as a violation
of the right of privacy and specifically said that truth is no bar
to an action for the invasion of such right. However, on the
theory which has been worked out in this article, it would not be
necessary to fall back upon the right to privacy to justify such a
decision. It would be more consistent, and would avoid the
treacherous doctrines of the rules in respect to privacy, to admit
that one has a right not to be insulted in the presence of third
persons when the purpose of such affront is to further the
interests of the utterer.
But on the basis of language found in a number of the hold-
ings involving conductor insults to passengers, it becomes
apparent that at times the truth of an utterance might have some
bearing in an action for insult. Several of the decisions 47 imply
that if plaintiff had not paid his fare, a rather strong accusation
on the part of the conductor could be overlooked because of the
feeling that he was goaded into using strong language. In other
'15This theory is expressed by Professor Harper at page 523 of his
work on Torts (1933).
'
0 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927).
47 Bleecker v. Colorado and S. R. R., 50 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481
(1911); Humphrey v. Michigan United Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N. W.
447 (1911); Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 178 N. Y. 347, 70 N. B.
857 (1904); Lipman v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 108 S. C. 151, 93 S. E. 714
(1917).
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words, we cannot accuse him of speaking improperly or roughly
out of sheer meanness or for purposes of pure self-interest.
And now that insult as a new tort has been exposed under
the searching light of inquiry, is it so new a tort? Or does it
merely represent a sane extension and interpretation of already
well-founded doctrines?
PRACTICAL Joxs
The ideology which this article has woven out of insult
cases can serve as a bridge to lead into the field of practical jokes.
It can explain the result in Nickerson v. Hodges,48 where the
seeker after legendary buried treasure was conspicuously humili-
ated by a defendant who buried a pot of earth and rock for her
to find, containing directions, between its double lids, that it was
to be opened with due ceremony between an entire gathering of
relatives and others.
There are, however, other types of practical jokes which can
bring about mental distress even though no one is caused public
embarrassment. Illustrations of such jokes can be found in the
reports. In a Maryland case49 the plaintiff fainted when she
found a dead rat in a wrapped grocery package which a mis-
chievous delivery boy handed to her, in a Canadian case5o the
plaintiff was shocked and became ill as a result of hearing the
false report, purposely circulated, that her son had committed
suicide, and in an English case5 ' a wife was frightened and made
ill when she received an erroneous report intended to fool her
into believing that her husband had broken two legs in an acci-
dent. Since in the three last named decisions the plaintiff suf-
fered physical as well as emotional results, the judges did not
have to face the issue raised by this article. But would it be
startling if a court determined that such described acts would
produce mental distress of such serious proportions as to warrant
the giving of a money judgment? Such a conclusion would not
seem to present a really radical theory. Would it not merely
be an adaptation of Professor Harper's "common sense" guide52
146 La. Ann. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 Atl.
22 (1931).
0Blelitzi v. Obadish, 15 Sask. L. R. 153, 65 Dom. L. R. 627, 2
W. W. R. 238 (1921).
"Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q. B. 57, 66 L. J. Q. B. 493 (1897).
'upra, note 38.
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to tort decisions? Surely it is common sense to believe that the
woman who finds a dead rat in what she thought was a package
of meat, who is told her son committed suicide, or who is informed
that her husband is seriously injured will suffer great agony of
mind. And on the matter as to whether emotional distress did
actually result, the jury has full control. It can decide to believe
the word of the victim after it has heard proof of the act, or it
can demand corroborating evidence from other parties as to the
plaintiff's reaction at the instant the joke was perpetrated.
THRFATS oF FUTURE HARx
As was the case in connection with the transition from the
field of insults to practical jokes, much of what has been said
makes it easy to move into another division of the general topic.
The path of common sense seems to lead right to the case of
Wilson v. Wilkins.53 In the face of threats made to put a rope
around plaintiff's neck if he did not leave the community within
ten days, a holding which would not award damages for mental
suffering would seem untenable. Surely the usual (perhaps
almost universal) experience of mankind bears witness to the fact
that people do worry about threats of future harm. Since that
is a known fact of every day life, it is frankly surprising that the
logic behind allowing recovery is not widely recognized. The
theories growing out of the law of assault actions seem weakest
at the very point of failing to give relief to those who suffer
mental disturbance because of threats of future harm. The law
of assault worked on the assumption that unless a man was
threatened by the immediate application of force, he had no cause
to fear because if he were allowed an interval, he could take steps
to protect himself from the actual consummation of a battery.
This theory is sound if scrutiny is centered upon whether or not
such threats of future harm give rise to a right to attack on the
excuse of provocation. But it appears unsound in the face of
actual knowledge that most people who are threatened suffer
mental torment. Even the fact that the utterer might be appre-
hended and punished by the law would not remove the fear of
possible reprisal engendered by the original threat. It would
seem, therefore, that there is need for permitting recovery. To do
-181 Ark. 137, 25 S. W. (2d) 428 (1930).
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so seems sane, and would not in any respect retard proper busi-
ness activity. The latter statement is supported by the implica-
tions coming out of Beck v. Luers,54 where it is brought out that
all threats are not improper threats. For instance, a declaration
that one will prosecute, if made in good faith and in a business-
like manner, cannot be construed as a threat of future harm.
If recovery is allowed for the mental unrest caused by
threats of future harm, it would not be in confict with the time
honored55 phrases that no recovery can be had if the threat is so
indecisive as to indicate no threat at all.56 For to justify award-
ing of damages for mental discomfort a real threat must be
established.
CoNcLUSION
It remains only to make explicit the premises upon which
this discourse has proceeded. Reasoning has had as its objective
to block off and focus attention upon a new tort which seeks to
give independent legal protection to an individual's interest in
his peace of mind. The veil of tradition was consciously lifted
so that a new tort should stand forth not as a symbol of what is
so euphemistically called "progress," but as a tool fashioned in
response to the imperative demands of justice and common sense
-as a tool made out of the respectable, tried ideas of the past.
Viewed in such a light, the change in dress from the old to the
new can be recognized as superficial and not fundamental.
"126 N. W. 811 (Iowa 1910).
1 Tuberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. Rep. 3 (1669) (where a party put
his hand to his sword and said, "If it were not assize time, I would
not take such language from you").
"Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350 (1919) where
an exclamation over the telephone to the exchange operator of "If
I were there, I would break your - damned neck" was held not a
threat.
